The paper discusses the collaboration network of local governments through their tendering activity.
Structural holes in the local governments' tendering activity network in a Hungarian sub-region Introduction Many tenders in the Hungarian tendering system have given special attention to those joint actions that targeted cross developments of multiple localities. Although joint actions are encouraged, collaboration between local governments in the tendering process cannot be considered typical. This characterizes small Hungarian localities, too, where the lack of infrastructure and lower representational power would justify strong collaboration and common interest representation.
Our research conducted in [2009] [2010] , mapping all tender collaborations of the local governments of the Kaposvár sub-region, also describes this phenomenon. The Hungarian sub-region was selected because of the high number of small settlements that it consists of (except Kaposvár, all the 54 settlements had fewer than 2000 inhabitants, whereas the typical case was under 1000).
Our research identified a social network with structural holes (the term refers to the gap between closely connected groups) of tender collaboration between local governments in the Kaposvár sub-region. The gatekeeper actors-or in Burt's terms opinion brokers-between closely connected groups (the tender writing companies), can benefit from the tender collaboration network characteristics of local governments in the sub-region.
After 2010 the local government system and the territorial administration changed which affected the tendering activity of the local governments as well, especially in the case of communities with fewer than 2000 inhabitants. Our empirical evidence refers to the 2009-2010 years, and we can only make some hypothesis based on a couple of interviews on the consequences that the changes introduced after 2010 may have brought.
Background
According to Vági (1982) before the regime change in 1990 in Hungary the hierarchy of settlements was associated with a centralized resource distribution system that strengthened regional inequalities. After 1990, with the implementation of the local government law, decentralization began, which had an impact on the resource distribution system, too. This law established the structure and function of the local government sector (Pálné Kovács 2008) distinguishing it in four structural characteristics compared with other European systems: the organizational differentiation of the small settlements' local governments, the differentiation of power, the arbitrariness of the association system and the building of a Hungarian-specific local government/ state administration level. However, this law did not address the problem of the small settlements, while the empowerment of the localities was not defined specifically (Pálné Kovács 2008) .
Although Hungarian local governments have a lot of leeway, in reality they have to make many compromises while completing their compulsory tasks. Tendering activity oriented to development funds was considered an optional task that could be tackled only after the local government had completed its compulsory or operating tasks.
Separating the operating funds from development funds, in the early 2000s there were governmental resources that financed the compulsory operative activities of local governments: infrastructural funds (TEKI, 2 CÉDE 3 ) and funds for financing those local governments disadvantaged beyond their fault (ÖNHIKI). This kind of financing was discontinued in 2010. In parallel with this kind of financing, the process of pre-accession and accession to European Union changed the system of financing local governments. The accent was moved to development funds for local governments at the beginning, with the help of SAPARD and LEADER programs, later with the help of applying for funds to the National Development Agency (NFÜ).
Our study was conducted in [2009] [2010] , when tendering activity of local governments amounted to applying for national operational funds (TEKI, CÉDE, ÖNHIKI) and also EU development funds through Rural Development Plans (NVT, ÚMVP, NFT, ÚMFT) and the National Development Agency (NFÜ).
We were interested in the collaboration characteristics of small localities (up to 2000 inhabitants). That is why we conducted our research in the Kaposvár sub-region, where small settlements were overrepresented (except Kaposvár city, all the localities were home to fewer than 2000 inhabitants). According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) in 2009 although 75% of the total number of settlements had fewer than 2000 inhabitants (N=2381). The question is how do these settlements manage their tendering activity? What network conditions define collaboration between small settlements in their tendering activity?
Originally the Kaposvár sub-region included 77 settlements (as in Figure 1 ). However, the aggregated economic indicators for all the localities in the region was relatively good, influenced by Kaposvár's good economic indicators (low unemployment rate, high level of incomes, etc.). For this reason 22 settlements chose to secede from Kaposvár and to join Kadarkút, another sub-region. The Kadarkút sub-region had the most disadvantaged (LHH) classification (assigned to regions with poor economic indicators), making it possible for the local governments to obtain down payment discounts through tendering activity.
The remaining 54 settlements in the Kaposvár sub-region also organized themselves into three micro-regions: the micro-region of Igal, the micro-region of Kaposvár-Somogyjád and the micro-region of Zselic.
Development goals of the Kaposvár sub-region were set out by the Kaposvár Multi-Purpose Sub-region Association (KTKT) in 2005, an organization founded especially to help the localities realize their development in concordance with sub-regional aims. Long-term goals were defined in connection with improving quality of life, infrastructural developments, environmental protection, economic developments, improvement of the la-2 Development support for regional equalization 3 Support for local development projects bor market etc. Tendering activity of local governments and also of the KTKT were subordinated to these goals.
Collaboration between settlements through tendering activity was encouraged by the KTKT. As the small settlements were having difficulties with tender writing because of their lack of knowledge and human resources, the KTKT established a tender-writing organization, the Paktum Iroda, which assisted in the tender writing activity of the settlements at a very advantageous price.
After we finished our research in 2010, a reorganization of the system came to light, motivated by the new national administration and local government system changes.
This reorganization resulted in prestige loss for the local political elites with the introduction of the five year cycle and reduction of the number of delegates in parliament. The tasks of local governments were also decreased by centralization (public education, some social care duties, health care, etc.) and magisterial duties were removed from local governments.
In the case of small localities the possibility of compulsory associations was introduced, but it is exactly these localities that lost most of their functions (Pálné Kovács 2014) . Furthermore, the law on sub-regional association and the Companies Act were repealed. Partly because of these changes in the studied sub-region of the 54 locality collaboration, the KTKT ceased to function. The failure of the KTKT is unique in the region, for example, the Kadarkút sub-region still exists. Even prior to ceasing it was a massive task to represent the interests in a unified way for a region with that many localities. Following the abolition of micro regions and sub-regions, in 2015 mayors unquestionably miss 'belonging to somewhere.' No structure remained of an inter-locality collaboration, common interest representation from the old sub-regional level. Although some entities do exist today, with the alliance of Somogyjád (the old center of the sub-region) there is a social network of 33 localities, a public education network of 18 localities, and a collaboration of 43 localities with the call for internal control. The Zselic micro region recognized as the most integrated one in 2010, is not a member of these associations. Theoretical frame Report on the tendering field of local governments in the first seven year cycle of joining the EU.
Theoretical and empirical research studies from Hungary have several conclusions as to the methods of distribution of local government tenders. There is a theoretical background as to how the funding of local governments adjusts to institutional transformation (Somlyódyné 2003 , Kovács 2008 , Pálné Kovács 2008 . With the appearance of EU funds for local governments the number of studies that focus on the institutional distribution of sources (Perger 2009 , Pálné Kovács 2011 , and the effects of the funds distribution (Voszka 2006 , Pálné Kovács 2009 , Perger 2009a and 2009b , Balogh 2009 , Hutkai 2009 
Separating the governmental operating funds from the developmental grant funds, Somlyódiné (2003) analyzed the allocation of national operational resources: in the case of sources like TEKI, which was abolished in 2010, and CÉDE, it was found that the principle of need and fairness prevailed. ÖNHIKI was another source of support used among local governments, that provided help for those who were disadvantaged beyond their fault, and although from the national budget came only a small amount of support, in 1999 one third of all Hungarian local governments had to rely on this support to ensure their operability (Puskás 2000) .
In parallel with the national resources, which were firstly operational in nature, the pre-accession and later post-accession EU development funds appeared. The pre-accession process was intended to develop the institutional system following a bottom-up design and regional planning. It is relied on current need and after the accession would further support maintaining finance of the development. Perger (2009) calls attention to the inconsistency between economic indicators and socio-economic development: while the economic indicators are favorable for Hungarian society, economic and social development is lagging behind.
Analyzing the use of resources from a sociological perspective, Kovách (2007) concludes that the business sector gradually gained ground in the financial funds raising system against local governments. Kovách named the process 'project conceiving,' in which the local governments are not able to perform the undertaken tasks, and they are then forced to outsource certain duties in the form of projects. As a consequence designers, experts, advisors, managers, organizers, civil servants, and researchers gained greater opportunities and influence in the preparation and execution of the national and EU development programs. The 'project class' according to Kovách is the social group (not social class or order) that is able, with the help of its social capital, to legitimize their own influence or power in the project.
The impact of resource allocation on regional inequality was investigated by Balogh (2009) , who found that chosen projects are not reducing inequality. He also found that the individual's position in politics played no major role in winning tenders.
Organization theory of public administration and local governments Organizational theory of public administration and local governments became popular in the sixties (represented in the USA by Merton (1968 Merton ( [1949 ), and in Europe by Weber (1970) and Crozier (1964) , while in Hungary Lőrincz, Nagy, and Szamel (1976) gave an overview of the contemporary perceptions of public administration).
The sociology of organizations approach to local governments was reconsidered when scientific interest was turned toward social networking of local governments. Local community studies continued-or redefined-opinion leader researches, and by investigating local/community power and mapping relations among individuals/organizations (Dahl, 1958 , Polsby 1959 , 1962 for example) foresaw the social capital, embeddeddness and social network approaches.
Recognizing the importance of regional power relations, in the 90's scientific interest was shifted towards research focusing on municipality, regional, interregional and personal relationships (Pálné Kovács 2008) . Due to the urban regime school, the focus of research was not institution or structural elements, but the personal relations and circumstances affecting behavior (Stone 1998 (Stone [1995 , Stoker 1998 Stoker [1995 ). This school/paradigm will gain even more importance in the (macro level) network approach in the governance literature.
Governance literature's foundational recognition is that the government is not the sole decision maker but the civil society is also playing an important role (Rhodes 2000) . But it was this governance literature that brought up several public policy dilemmas such as defining the bound between cooperation and competition, the topics of openness and closeness, controllability and flexibility, accountability and efficiency (Jessop 2003) .
A new term metagovernance got introduced through which Kooiman (2000) differentiated three levels of government: first-order (problem-solving), second-order (institutional changes) and meta-order (governing the government). The appearance of transnational organizations-such as the European Union-can be connected to this approach as well. These results lead us to the conclusion, that local governments are using their social relations, whereas civil society is less embedded. The comparison of the sectors also shows that local governments have an emphasized role, as their network is the strongest (among politicians, media and local development institutions).
In our study, we use the results of the ADAPT research as foundational while going further in considering the characteristics of social networks and with inspiration from Ebers (1997) , we suggest the differentiation of two separate research mechanisms. The first mechanism is the micro-macro approach,from?the personal network we can deduce the inter-organizational network. Second is the macro-macro approach, where from the regional network we can draw out the inter-organizational network.
Micro-macro approach of inter-organizational social networks
Micro-macro approaches are those studies that are deducing inter-organizational ties from interpersonal connections. Social network analysis on a macro level (inter-organization relations) reaches conclusions similar to micro levels (personal relations) studies (see Powell 1990 , Burt 1992 likewise with studies where economic actions or inter-organization ties are deduced from the structure of personal networks (for example Uzzi 1996 , Burt 1992 and others).
Macro-macro studies are making conclusions regarding the inter-organizational networks, by relying on the environment, the regional networks (Sabel 1989 , Saxenian 1994 , research of regional and local government relations (governance), collaboration or network studies of the development policy system. From one hand, this research uses micro-macro approach when, during the analysis of inter-organizational network of local governments, studies the network structure, especially the structural holes. In the inter-personal analysis, networks that have structural holes, gives opportunity to brokers for playing important roles. The role of brokers was first mentioned by Simmel (1921 Simmel ( (1908 ) who differentiated dyads from triads.
According to Simmel, triads are always carrying the possibility of breaking into dyads, which also means that the third member will be the subordinate of the new dyad. In this case the broker is the actor who as a tertius gaudens profits, while maintains the distance between the other two actors. The uniqueness of this relationship is the influence that the broker has on both actors. The most prominent broker literature is accorded to Fernandez and Gould (1994) , who altogether differentiated 5 broker types (liaison, itinerant, coordinator, gatekeeper, and representative). Burt (1999 Burt ( , 2005 mentioned the opinion broker term, which means a broker, who is carrying information from one opinion group to the other, taking advantage of the structural holes. Obsfeld (2005) introduced the tertius iugens term, who, unlike the selfish broker profiting from the lack of communication between two associated partners, rather initiates and facilitates the cooperation and communication between the partners.
On other hand, this research also takes into consideration the macro-macro level, when the regional relations between local governments and other tendering institutions are considered. Analysis also aimed to find out if a broker's position at the micro level remains the same at the macro level.
Network structure is analyzed taking into consideration these two approaches. Since the network study of relations among local governances is not very popular in the sociological literature, the multiple functions of different organizations, as actors of a network, lead to definition difficulties.
Instead of terms such as opinion leader and opinion broker, which are already known from the specialized literature, our study prefers the notions of information leader and information broker. The information leader is the sociometric star, or the local government fulfilling the formerly used opinion leader role. The information broker is the local government that fulfills the role of a bridge as compared to the opinion broker among different actors of the network. The half structured interviews contained many questions, in this paper we will present only the results referred to the network investigation of tendering activity.
Network questions referred to the collaboration with other organizations through tendering activity.
In the case of notaries (where a single locality forms the notary) the questions referred to the locality, while in the case of district notaries (where typically 3 localities formed the district notary) the questions referred to all the localities in the district.
We were primarily interested in the inter-organizational relations between local governments. Secondly we were interested in the relations between local governments and other tendering institutions.
Through the investigation, and later through the analysis and interpretation the nodes of the networks represented organizations (local governments, tender writers and other regional tendering organizations).
The network investigation followed the section referred to the quantity of tenders, where the questions referred to the number and type of tenders of each localities. The interviewee was asked to list all the tenders (in the case of district notaries all the tenders of the localities from the district) in the past year.
All tender applicants were asked whether during the tendering activity help/consultancy or other type of collaboration was applied for with any other local government and/or other type of organization (like tender writers or local tendering agency) and interviewee were asked to name the organization they collaborated.
The questions were: 'During the tendering activity which organization helped you?' and 'Whose advice did you seek about the tender?' The methodology corresponded with the name generation method, where a node generated other nodes connected to it. As a result we get not only the inter-organizational network of local governments in the sub-region, but the inter-organizational network of local governments and other tendering institutions, too.
The relation between the collaborators was also classified. In the case of local governments we asked what kind of relation the collaborating localities' mayors or notaries have: formal (derived from district notaries or micro-regional relations) or informal (acquaintance or friendship). In the case of relation with tender writers we also asked why they chose the given tender writer, what kind of relation do they have with the tender writer: whether there are any other formal or mandatory collaborative terms and conditions (for example they have to collaborate to each other because they have legally defined relations or they are involved in regional associations), whether the collaboration has regional, county or national level, and finally whether the relation is a formal or personal one.
In order to better understand the collaboration networks of the local governments we made 10 complementary interviews with institutions regarded in some way as territorially important to tendering activity, such as with representatives of the regional development agency, tender writers, employees of institutions of regional importance (like Kaposvár University). We contacted all the regional development agencies, and the most mentioned three local tender writers.
The network relations were registered in a network matrix, 1 being the value for the existing relation, and 0 for the non-existing relations. Matrices were analyzed with Ucinet6 software, and networks were presented with Netdraw software.
In 2015 additional interviews were made in the region to inquire what happened to the previously investigated localities because of further changes in the local public administration system.
Research findings
Structural holes in the collaboration network of local governments As our research findings revealed, the network structure of local governments' tender collaboration networks was highly determined by the type of inter-organizational relations. Classifying the answers to the questions 'Why did you collaborate with the mentioned organizations through the specified tenders? How would you characterize the relation you have with the organizations you mentioned?' four types of collaboration could be distinguished in the Kaposvár sub-region.
The formal network is when local governments were collaborating through their legally defined relations, such as district clerks, regional association (KTKT), and the micro regions (with micro-regional centers in Somogyjád, Igal and Szentbalázs). Not being able-or not easily being able-to change the members and the conditions/premises is the most characteristic feature of formal relations. The formal network shows the hierarchy of localities in the administrative system where central nodes are micro regional centers (see Network1).
The quasi-formal relation connects those local governments that are not strictly following the formal demarcation. Associations with social implications, like development of education organizations, family support, social care, or sewage are not strictly following the sub-regional or micro-regional borders. For example, in the case of schools' integration tenders 18 localities were associated in order to develop schools' infrastructure.
The main idea of the joint action derived from Somogyjád's mayor, and also the president of KTKT, initially wanted to unify all the localities in the schools' integration tender, but later 18 localities agreed to associate.
Ties formed like this among localities can already suggest the kin-or negative ties among mayors to a small degree. The quasi-formal network differs from the formal network in the case of group members, but central nodes are very similar with those of formal networks (see Network 2).
The quasi-informal ties are often relying on informal relations connecting local governments with tender writing or consulting companies. Not derived from national administrative system, and neither from informal relations, some tender writers collaborated with local governments because they had a good reputation.
Gossip about the successes and 'good' relations of tender writers was spread among mayors. They wanted to reduce the risk of failing in a tender by working with those tender writers who had been successful in the past, or who had proper relations in the fund distribution system (see Network 3).
Finally, the informal network brings together the aid, mutual information exchange, and opinion groups regarding the tendering activity where sympathy, friendship and acquaintance ties dominate. Compared with the quasi-informal network, the informal network contains relations from other sub-regions (see Network 4).
Analyzing the answers to the question 'During the tendering activity which organization helped you?' we found out, that formal and quasi-formal relations were dominated contrary to quasi-informal and informal relations. In the case of quasi-formal and informal relations mayors and notaries typically mentioned tender writers instead of local government institution in addition to their formal relations.
Through the network analysis we visualized all the four types of relations in one network. Since the network ties represent collaboration, we worked with symmetric relations. Table 1 shows the relations reported by the mayors polled at four collaboration levels. The blue nodes were local governments in the Kaposvár sub-region. Red nodes represent tender writers (we did not obtain permission to use the tender writing companies' names). Green nodes are settlements from other sub-regions.
A total number of 18 tender writing companies, and 9 local governments from other sub-region were mentioned. The Kaposvár sub-region contained 54 localities, and two more nodes were added to the local network: a notary who played an important broker role in the relations between local governments (Jegyző), and the County Local Government (Megyei Önkormányzat). Based on these networks three characteristics of the tender collaboration can be observed.
1. In the tender collaboration networks formal relations dominate. Even when mayors and notaries were asked to mention with which organization they would prefer to collaborate, they usually mentioned the formal relations they already have with the other localities. That is why in the quasi-formal and informal networks the formal relations are represented.
2. The quasi-informal and informal networks move from the micro-macro approach to the macro-macro approach, where there are not only one type of organizations (local governments) in the network, but also other institutions that take part in the tendering system (tender writers, County Local Government). The role of tender writers in the tendering activity can be very important especially for small settlements without knowledge and capacity for writing tenders. Collaborations between tender writing companies and local governments were several: from the case where the tender writing company specifically asked local governments to collaborate in a tender (for example, the development of a children's playground) to the case where a tender writer was permanently employed, being responsible for searching out tendering opportunities, writing tenders and monitoring the development procedure.
3. The structure of tender collaboration network in the Kaposvár sub-region shows 'structural holes', which means that between densely connected groups brokers can provide information from one closely connected group to another. The question is which actor was able to take the most advantage from the peculiarities of the structural characteristics of the network.
Due to the domination of formal relations, collaborations within the sub-regions, typically the centers, had more ties. The degree of micro-regional center Somogyjád was 21 while Igal's was 20. The most interconnected group was the micro region of Zselic (with the center in Szentbalázs), where the local governments are permanently collaborating not only at formal, but at informal levels as well. The localities have similar geographic characteristics, they are representing their interests mutually and they apply for development sources together as well. The degree of Szentbalázs was 10 while Bőszénfa's was 16, and while the second is not a micro region center, due to the operation of a school, it is connected to the district notary of Nagyberk, and the mayor is also a member of several forums. The betweeness was the highest in the case of Somogyjád (1448,602), the most influential locality in the sub-region. Somogyjád was a micro-regional center, and a sub-regional center, too. The mayor of Somogyjád was also president of the KTKT (the sub-regional Association) and a member of the County Local Government.
The formal and informal tender collaborating relations suggest that the most influential or 'information leader' node can be well defined: the local government playing the central role in the sub-region (Somogyjád), the mayor being a member of many forums and associations. At this point was not very clear what role the structural holes can have in the network, and which institution can profit from this network structure.
The laughing third party
The localities of the sub-region (without Kaposvár) submitted 269 tenders in the observed period of time, and from these they claimed the help of professional tender writers in 177 cases. At the time of our study there were 18 market based tender writers in the sub-regions, complemented with the 3 organizations responsible for Leader tenders.
The sub-regional network shows that the tender writing companies were able to bridge among localities and even sub-regions which are otherwise not connected (e.g., P5, P15, P19, P3). Network 5 highlights the role of tender writer companies from the previous network and represents which localities (red nodes) are connected with specific tender writer companies (blue nodes). P4, P3, P2, P10, P15, P6, P5, P14, P8 and P9 tender writing companies collaborated with two, or more local governments. The most integrated tender writer was P9, who managed the tendering activity of all localities in the Zselic micro-region. About P18, P7, P17, P16 the interviewee did not mention other connections. What we can observe in this network is that some tender writers connected localities from different notary districts or micro regions with each other (for example in the case P2 who connected Mezőcsokonya with Somogysárd, or P3 who connected Mosdós with Hetes, otherwise connected only through the sub-regional center, Somogyjád).
Network 5. Collaboration ties of local governments and tender writing companies
Results raise the question what explains the importance of the tender writing companies in the local government collaboration network, especially when the tendering system has service institutes that should aid the local governments in their activities (for example KTKT, DDRFÜ, etc.). It seems a viable answer that where the institutional system is not able to integrate the functions accordingly to the tender system (meaning the majority of small localities), the outsourcing of human capital, the trust in the professionalism of tender writers, and the hope of accumulating extra points during the application, the local governments reached out to tender writers. But it is also worth considering, that it was in the interest of the local governments to maintain a 'network with holes.' Perhaps a less dense network allows certain lobby activities, when actors believe that the successfulness of a tender does not depend solely on the quality of the application.
Regional networks-important, yet still peripheral tender writers?
The previous sections analyzed only the answers given by representatives of local governments to the questions 'During the tenders which organization helped you?' and 'Whose advice did you seek about the tender?' The mentioned local governments and tender writing companies were visualized in the above networks.
However, in the regional tender collaboration network there are influential service tendering institutions, which do not have the role of help giving in the administrative part of tender writing, but were responsible for information giving about the tendering possibilities and encouraging the collaboration between local governments by providing them with informational support. Analyzing the answers given to the question 'Which other organizations do you meet through your tendering activity?' interviewees named the KTKT (the sub-regional Association: Kaposvári Többcélú Kistérségi Társulás), the sub-regional coordinator from DDRFÜ (regional development agency: Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Ügynökség), associations due to previous PHARE and SAPARD programs (funding available in the pre-accession phase to European Union), now responsible for LEADER projects (Kopányvölgye Helyi Akciócsoport, Zselica Szövetség, Zselici Lámpások, Bányai Panorá-ma Egyesület, Észak Kaposi Partnerek). The partner communities in these last three associations did not follow the sub-region grouping. Within a micro-region, these organizations could strengthen integration, as they were providing the smaller funds accessible for small grants.
In Network 6 blue represents local governments, red nodes are tender writers, green nodes are local governments from other sub-regions and the regional tendering institutions are purple.
The coordinators (P2, P10, P9, P3) who spread information among local governments about tenders collaborating with local governments that already knew about them.
The itinerant broker (P14), who provided outsider help to groups otherwise strongly connected.
Among the tender writing companies active in the Kaposvár sub-region, according to the Fernandez and Gould (1994) typology of brokers we could typically identify two kinds of brokers.
In the event that these organizations were also included in the collaboration, they became the most central by the number of connections: KTKT and Koppányvölgye Helyi Akciócsoport with a degree of 55, Zselici Lámpások with 48 ties, Zselica Szövetség with 32, Bányai Panoráma Egyesület had 29 connections, while Somogyjád, the sub-regional seat had 24 ties. The betweenness was also high for these organizations, although with this indicator the brokerage role played by Igal, Somogyjád, Hetes and Taszár came to the fore.
Interviews and observations made in the research period lead to the conclusion that the history of collaboration has an impact on partner relations as well. A good example to this is the bloc from the Surány valley, as prior to detaching from the sub-region, the tender collaboration with localities belonging to the Kadarkút sub-region already existed from the beginning of 1990s.
Localities from the Surján valley and Zselic decided not to maintain a legal organization, but to join the Zselica society, adding up to 32 local governments and 3 civilian members to the organization. This is following the European Leader logic, a voluntary collaboration with no public administration obligation, building up from the bottom where everyone elaborates their own agenda. The Zselica society, with the detaching of the Kadarkút sub-region became the connection between the sub-region of Kaposvár and Kadarkút.
Besides them, the Zselici Lámpások (the organization responsible for the Leader tenders), the Észak-Kaposi Partnerek, as well as the Koppányvölgye Helyi Akciócsoport also supported the collaboration.
In the regional social network one organization had a central role, the KTKT. Localities adjusted their development to the regional development goals drafted by the association. A somewhat mixed opinion about the KTKT came through from the interviews. Most often interviewees emphasized that the size and diversity of interests in the sub-region otherwise collaborative localities romper from each other. The KTKT as an institute did not write any tenders, but operated a section-the Paktum Office-that for a symbolic amount helped the
Network 6. Regional collaboration network of local governments and organizations active in the tendering activity
localities with their applications. Interestingly, the Paktum Office and the KTKT merged during interviewing, so if someone sought help from the 'sub-region', it was likely that the help came from the Paktum Office.
Given its position, it is not surprising that the KTKT had the highest betweeness indicator: this was the organization that connected all localities with each other. Due to the number of ties, a similar position was filled by the sub-region coordinator of DDRFÜ, with the difference that he did not provide any concrete help in submitting the tenders. They are connected with the localities of the sub-region for the dissemination: he was informing the leaders of the localities about the tender possibilities. Interviewees recognized the informational importance of the sub-regional coordinator, yet they also emphasized, that the problem is not in the lack of knowledge, but lies more in not having enough capacity and human resources to prepare the tenders.
Network 7 shows the connection between localities and tendering organizations, including regional tendering institutions, red nodes are localities, while blue nodes represent the other institutions.
Although, as tendering activity is considered, the micro regions were primarily all held together by the sub-regional association and local development organizations, because of protracted financing these organizations have had the most significant losses. Personnel changes at the local government brought new interests to the fore, causing protracted tenders to lose their popularity.
The institutional background exists for the proper support of the local governments, but in reality during the tenders it was not these institutions whose help was solicited. In answer to the question 'During the last tender, whose help did you ask for?' mayors pointed to the tender writing companies. Network 8 shows that while local governments are members of different collaboration networks, typically they work with the tender writer(s) through their operative tendering activity. In the network green represents institutions at the regional-level that help the tendering activity of local governments, while red nodes are for local governments.
Network 7. Direct collaboration among local governments and organizations in the tendering activity
As a conclusion we can say that although there are formal connections between localities, the tender writing and administrative help for local governments was not shared among one another: they either solved it with their own workers, or they asked for help from specialist companies. The lack of collaboration among local governments is seen from the responses of interviewees about the consequences of competition for scarce resources.
Conclusions
On the principle of equal access, information reaches all localities through several channels (newsletter, homepage of NFÜ, tender coordinators) assuming that small and big localities are equally able to use the information. Howerver, the odds of receiving and implementing the information are different for every local government. Being informed or under-informed can highly depend on whether they have their own tendering department. Even if information gathering is fully provided for local governments, especially small localities have difficulties in realizing collaboration for tendering purposes and through tender writing processes.
Regarding the hierarchical structure we experienced a low level cooperation of local governments, based mainly on formal or quasi-formal relations. Two types of key actors were identified: one is the information leader, and the other the information broker.
In the Kaposvár sub-region the information leader role is fulfilled solely by local governments (taking us back to the micro-macro approach of the study). The information brokerage role is not very obvious in the network, where more types of organizations are represented (taking us back to the macro-macro approach of the study): it could be local governments, tendering local institutions, or tender writing companies. Based on the interview results, mayors and notaries reported that the greatest help in tender writing was obtained from outsourced tender writing companies. That is why they can be considered the laughing third parties of the col-
Network 8. Organizational collaboration of local governments, reflecting the frequency of collaborations mentioned in interviews
laboration. Actors like the Sub-regional Association (KTKT), or local development organizations have important broker roles in the regional tender activity network, yet the local governments rely first of all on the help of the tender writing companies. It seems that in accessing the financing resources, the tender writers are information brokers, the laughing third parties, who can exploit a bridge between two, otherwise not connected local governments.
Meanwhile, tender collaboration developed in a unique way. The upswing of tender writing companies had started in Hungary after the regime change and more specifically with the appearance of pre-accession funds (Phare, Sapard). By 2004, the year of accession, already prepared mediator actors (mostly tender writing companies, i.e., profit oriented businesses) were expecting the challenges of the allocations of the EU funds and they had a giant role in having Hungary efficiently use the EU support funds among the newly joined countries. After nearly ten years of an open tender writing market, a slow closing down period came. The role of the tender writing companies proved to be ephemeral, lasting only as long as the learning period, in which local governments adapted to the tender system. It seems as if tender writing as an activity is not helping the local governments in the sub-region. Given that the execution of tenders also requires massive human resources, the small communities claim 'package' type of market services: contractor, procurement and tender writer.
In their case 'good will' is an extremely important factor that at this point local governments seem to discover only through their lobbying capacity and having acquaintances at 'good places'. Survival in the narrowing tender writing market can only be achieved by companies that offer diversified activities and maintain good relations with local governments.
A special situation developed within tender writing support institutions that are not necessarily market-based. In 2010 we saw that the KTKT had their own tender office (Paktum Office), and they offered help to local governments below the market price. With the demise of this association the office was also closed down.
As a quasi replacement at the county notary's office there is a Project office, that offers professional help to the local governments.
After 2010 the local government system and the territorial administration changed, which has affected the tender collaboration network of the local governments as well. Additional interviews made in 2016 revealed that KTKT was discontinued. Without this association, and taking into consideration the changes in administrative duties of local governments, and the relegation of tender writing companies, the formal collaborative network of the localities in the region has changed drastically. One can suppose that excluding the most influential node from the network, the accent will move to the following organizations in the hierarchy of relations: to micro-regional centers. But interviewees from the most integrated and densely connected micro-region reported the lack of any collaboration. The following research steps would be the investigation of collaboration in the sub-region and the comparison of actual network structure with that from 2009-2010.
We can only suppose that without the hierarchical pressure quasi-informal and informal relations are on the rise. And it is still a question how the relegated tender writing companies influence the tender collaboration network of the sub-region. 
